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1 Introduction 
This paper is a summary of my doctoral dissertation on philosophical interpreta- 
tions of Einstein's special and general theories of relativity, submitted to the Dept. for 
History of Science, Univ. of Hamburg, in 1989, which was recently published in the 
Series Science Networks at Birkauser.i After a brief overview of its content I will 
focus on a discussion of the method employed to analyse philosophical interpretations 
of a physical theory. 
My analysis is based 
- firstly on about 2500 contemporary published texts about the theories of relativity 
written both by scientists and philosophers. These texts have not been of particular in- 
terest to historians or philosophers of science up to now; this is understandable from 
the fact that many of them contain gross oversimplifications, misinterpretations and 
incorrect statements about the theories of relativity. But I claim that it is just these 
misinterpretations that can serve as a clue to a better understanding of the general pro- 
cess by which philosophical interpretations are formed (see next section). 
- Secondly, collections of the many unpublished documents preserved in the estates 
of physicists of that time were another very important source, most notably, the dupli- 
cate files of the 'Einstein Archive' at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem located at the 
Collected Paper of Albert Einstein in Boston, which contain hundreds of letters by 
philosophers asking Einstein to explain features of his theories. These include Bergson, 
Bridgman, Cassirer, Metz, Meyerson, Petzoldt, Reichenbach, Schlick among others. 
- Thirdly, other unpublished materials of interest were found in the estates of 
philosophers, e.g., of Reichenbach and Carap (Pittsburgh), of Schlick (Amsterdam), 
of Bavink (Bielefeld), of Petzoldt (TU Berlin), or of Friedrich Adler (Vienna). All 
these letters are very telling about the different strategies used by each philosopher in 
attempting to understand a particular aspect in the theory to be interpreted. This strug- 
gle for a closer understanding of scientific matters outside the traditional realm of phi- 
losophy was largely omitted or hidden in the published papers. 
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Figure 1: Application of relativity theory (RT) to the 'intcrpretational 
frames' of some schools of philosophers (not comprehensive) 
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2. Some General Traits of Philosophical Interpretations 
In figure 1 (= figure 6.1. of my thesis (footnote 1).), some (but by no means all) 
contemporary philosophical schools [ovals] are depicted as they relate [arrows] to se- 
lected issues in the theories of relativity [boxes in the center]. Although I could not, of 
course, achieve completeness with this two-dimensional sketch, it illustrates some 
general features of philosophical interpretations: 
- The various schools discussed the special (left) and general (right) theories of rela- 
tivity electively, picking out and emphasizing drastically different parts. 
- While several groups only dealt with a very few isolated topics from both theories 
but showing no interest in their context, some schools were ambitious enough to try to 
incorporate substantial parts of the theories into their interpretations. 
- Representatives of some groups of philosophers tried only to understand and to 
highlight parts of Einstein's theories, while others did not confine themselves to this 
restricted role, but openly refuted parts of both theories as being in conflict with their 
general opinions (these cases are marked with double arrows in fig. 1). Although you 
can often find psychological reasons stemming from the individual personalities of 
the interpreters behind these different reactions to a compelling scientific issue (an ar- 
rogant Oskar Kraus versus a modest Ernst Cassirer), there are also different models 
about the relationship between physics and philosophy which ultimately account for 
these astonishing variations. For example, a critique of scientific results was forbid- 
den for the logical empiricists; they could only legitimately analyze them, put them 
into a broader context and, perhaps, make them thereby more comprehensible to the 
public. On the contrary, a realm of fundamental issues existed for the neo-Kantians, 
that could only be approached using a transcendental form of philosophy, which 
sought to deduce the a priori patterns of the world excluding any possible interference 
with empiricial issues. Since space and time were among them, a conflict with the 
special theory of relativity (STR) was to be expected. 
3. The Guiding Idea of My Analysis and Presentation: The Dependence of 
Philosophical Interpretations on a Framework of Underlying Assumptions 
Now let me briefly discuss how the various philosophical interpretations of rela- 
tivity theory came about. The issues involved in the special and general relativity the- 
ories, which were essentially spelled out since 1905 and 1915, resp., intrinsically in- 
volved what could be called an interpretational framework consisting of general 
epistemological and methodological convictions which ultimately determined the re- 
sulting philosophical interpretations of the theories. The vast differences in these 
often implicit background assumptions explain the formation of completely different, 
in a sense, incommensurable interpretations of one and the same physical theory. 
Some scholars (e.g., John Stachel, Arthur Fine, and at the meeting in Minneapolis, 
David Stump) have remarked that it is misleading to speak of 'one' theory. Of course, 
I do not contest that there were a lot of theoretical alternatives to Einstein's general 
theory of relativity (GTR), construed by Abraham, Nordstrom, Weyl, Mie, etc., all 
differing on specific points from the standard general theory, and I also agree that cer- 
tain points were not resolved for a long time (e.g., value of the cosmological constant, 
preference of cosmological solutions, singularities). These clearly defined identifiable 
theoretical alternatives to Einstein's GTR might also deserve a philosophical interpre- tation in their own right, but their existence does not preclude us from speaking of a 
standard GTR as physicists do, e.g., in their textbooks on the special or the general 
theory of relativity. Despite what might be called the not yet settled boundary of the 
theory ('Forschungsfront', 'research frontier'), where contemporary physicists were in disagreement on many points, what formed the 'hard core' of the theory was undis- 
Figure 2. Overview of phenomenalism (Mach school) 
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puted and was not altered by further developments at the research frontier.3 So for ex- 
ample, the two axioms of the constancy of light in vacuo and the principle of relativi- 
ty form the 'hard core' of the SRT. In this sense, my model assumption of one theory 
being interpreted in different ways is justified at least pragmatically. At the end of my 
paper another argument for this model assumption will be given, based on considera- 
tions of what would result if one would not make it. 
To get a clear picture of the complicated relationship between general but often 
implicit background assumptions and specific interpretative statements, between in- 
teral and surface structures, to employ the terms of linguists, I modelled the arrival 
upon an interpretation as a multilevelled process of specialization that I will dis- 
cuss now within the Machianism example4 (Cf. fig. 2). 
In the beginning of this multigrade process of interpretation we find very few funda- 
mental premises (for the Machians, those of epistemological phenomenalism, coined by 
Berkeley as 'esse est percipi', and methodological theory instrumentalism). Those basic 
convictions are obligatory and not questioned by members of this group of philoso- 
phers: They form a core (analogous to Lakatos's hard core in scientific theories). 
General statements are derived from these core premises in a first specialization 
step, e.g., about the aim of scientific theories, the status of their results, etc. [see the 
arrows from the top of figure 2 to the second level]. These general opinions form the 
level of understanding, so to speak, on which the scientific theory to be interpreted is 
projected; they define what I earlier referred to as the 'interpretational framework'. In 
a further step of specialization, the concrete interpretational statements about relativi- 
ty theory are derived from this interpretational framework [arrows from level 2 to 
level 3 of figure 2]. The latter is usually fixed before the interpreters started their 
study of relativity theory. Described in another way (as seen from what will be dis- 
cussed ahead), those topoi in the theories that offered some connection to their pre- 
fixed interpretational framework were selected for further interpretation; others, that 
did not fit were either left out or reformulated so that they would fit within the pro- 
crustean bed. This mechanism already explains the astonishing similarities in the se- 
lections of independent interpreters from similar backgrounds. 
Let us regard our example. Again and again the Machians emphasized, that for 
them the physical principle of relativity, one of the axioms of special relativity, was 
nothing but a trivial consequence of a much broader 'epistemological relativity' be- 
tween a describing subject and the resulting description. For Petzoldt, whose own 
philosophical system was consequently called "relativistic positivism", this 'relativi- 
ty' of motion, of size, of time (and of virtually everything else) was the central feature 
of both theories of relativity-he largely ignored its complementary aspect, namely 
the prescript of finding observer-independent invariants. 
And it is in this area of obliterated parts of the theory where the defects of his in- 
terpretations show up. Not only Petzoldt, but all Machians had serious trouble with an 
adequate understanding of the postulate of the constancy of light c in vacuum, the 
second axiom of special relativity. You can often find their claim in letters to Einstein 
and other physicists, but also in their publications, that a properly understood theory 
of relativity should not contain absoluta independent of observers. They demanded the complete relativization of all physical quantities, thereby completely misunder- 
standing the aim of Einstein's relativity theory,5 and they openly rejected an absolute 
magnitude like c.6 The Machians operated for a couple of years with this obviously 
philosophically motivated pseudo-argument against the special theory of relativity, 
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until Petzoldt and some of his allies (e.g., Lammel) found a way to make their peace 
with the constancy axiom of special relativity via their methodological demand of 
simplicity. This step required a sort of reordering of their hierarchy of norms (simplic- 
ity of the axiomatically formulated theory now ranked above proper relativization, 
formerly it was the other way round), but this example demonstrates once again, that 
inspite of considerable mental work it was possible to adapt the interpretative frame- 
work to the challenges of a new scientific theory, if and only if one was only willing 
to revise this framework instead of artificially remolding the theory to their own 
guidelines. So much for the Machian example. 
Many examples and case studies in my thesis show the following bias in philo- 
sophical interpretations of physical theories. On the one hand, most of the inter- 
preters of relativity theory highlighted and clarified at least one of its facettes, thereby 
helping in the understanding of its meaning and of its context, or brought to light his- 
torical roots of some of the steps made in it. Let me give you some examples: 
Bridgman's operationalism focussed on Einstein's operational definition of simultane- 
ity for spatially distant events; Cassirer's form of neo-Kantianism emphasized the 
conceptual change in the constitution of physical objects-away from the classical 
(material) substances, towards formal (mathematical) invariants of tensor calculus. 
Poincare and the later conventionalists helped to realize the existence and to under- 
stand the significance of free conventions, e.g., in the description of the geometry of 
space; logical empiricists further clarified the complicated relationship between theo- 
retical terms and observational statements, rules of correspondence and various layers 
of theories. Several groups also proposed reasons why Einstein's relativity theories 
were preferable to their historical alternatives. 
On the other hand, most of the competing contemporary interpreters of relativity 
theory fell into the all too human mistake of overstressing their point, e.g., 
Bridgman's operationalism fit well for an understanding of Einstein's redefinition of 
simultaneity, but did not help in understanding the meaning of Christoffel symbols of 
the second kind or the Ricci tensor. It was a mistaken view of the meaning of relativi- 
ty theory that led Heisenberg to expose the view (in a discussion with Einstein), that it 
was the moral of relativity theory to use only operationally definable concepts.7 In 
fact, many of the contemporary philosophers unfortunately did not even reach an ade- 
quate level of understanding of the factual content of statements derived from the the- 
ory; some of them even ended up in open conflict with it by contradicting some rela- 
tivistic results caused by their disharmony with philosophically inspired assumptions, 
for example, the Bergsonians and their insistence upon the uniqueness of time as ulti- 
ma ratio of life and consciousness, or Dingler and his unshakable belief in the euclidi- 
ty of space, that he regarded as proven once and for all by his method of exhaustion. 
Very often in cases of conflict, the philosophical presuppositions were not reconsid- 
ered or questioned, but rather the scientific theory, irrespective of all scientific moti- 
vations for it. Either the theory was declared to be incompetent for dealing with mat- 
ters reserved to philosophers (as the conservative neo-Kantians said with respect to 
pure space and time as opposed to their empirical measurement which they held to be 
the task of physics), or the value and truth of the theory was radically questioned.8 
4. Further Application of this Method: The Formation of a Protective Belt of 
Einstein Defenders and Resulting Incommensurability in Philosophical Debates 
on the Theories of Relativity 
The method of setting apparently independent interpretative statements within an 
interpretative framework that explains how they came about, how they were motivated, 
is not only useful for a better understanding of the merits and limits of individual inter- 
175 
pretations, but is also helpful in bringing to light interesting consequences that appeared 
in the discussions of competing groups of philosophers about their resp. interpretations. 
One such consequence was the formation of what I have called a 'protective belt' 
of defenders of both theories of relativity-see figure 3 (= fig. 3.1. of my thesis). By 
1920, Einstein had become tired of repeatedly countering the antirelativists with the 
same arguments. So, philosophers with strong pro-relativistic opinions like 
Reichenbach and Petzoldt took over the defense of his theories, by inevitably evoking 
norms and arguments stemming from their own interpretational frameworks. Now the 
Einstein opponents responded to these defenses by confusing relativistic statements 
with the corresponding philosophical interpretations by Einstein's defenders. For in- 
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Figure 3. Overview on the contemporary disputes about relativity theory and the most perti- nent defenders of Einstein 
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stance, Petzoldt used his monadological perspectivism to defend the special theory of 
relativity against charges of missing absolutes and thereby provoked a further and 
more serious misunderstanding of this theory as subjectivism and relativism, which 
Einstein clearly had not meant. 
An even more radical form of misunderstanding occurred in most contemporary 
discussions between members of different groups. Here different interpretational 
frameworks clashed with each other. Both parties usually thought they had found 
compelling arguments to defeat their opponents but felt misunderstood by the other 
side, whose arguments simply seemed to go pointlessly astray. These heated discus- 
sions, full of metaphors of strife and battle,9 were subsequently forgotten but they are 
a highly interesting area for incommensurability studies. 
5. Preconditions and Criteria for a Successful Interpretation 
As mentioned before, I did not simply want to discuss all the historic cases of suc- 
cessful or unsuccessful interpretations, but also to find out what could be learnt from 
the mistakes made there-Which of these mistakes could have been avoided and 
how? In this context, only those cases where something went wrong and misinterpre- 
tations resulted were important. The abundance of contemporary interpretations of 
Einstein's theories of relativity between 1910 and ca. 1930 helped me to formulate the 
following preconditions for sound interpretations that avoid sidetracks, such as the 
distortion of the idea or statement at hand: 
1. Interpreters should show modesty and open-mindedness-it is they who are 
walking on foreign territory, so they have to learn about the procedure, the 
rules of argumentation, and the scientific facts and laws to be obeyed. 
Although it sounds quite trivial, this precondition was by no means fulfilled in 
the case of Einstein's interpreters.10 
2. Philosophical interpreters should aim at a precise understanding of the tech- 
nical, mathematical language, in which the theory is formulated. Only then can 
they really understand its structure; only then can they get a feeling for the 
strength of intratheoretical derivations and for the harmony (or as scientists 
often say: the beauty) of it as a whole. Otherwise, a partial, fragmented under- 
standing is the unavoidable result, in which some axioms, theorems or state- 
ments are overemphasized while others are illegitimately ignored. The selec- 
tivity of most contemporary interpretations is a clear indication of the inobser- 
vance of this precondition. Also, the overwhelming majority of the most accu- 
rate interpreters were not accidently educated physicists or mathematicians, 
i.e., Schlick, Reichenbach, Frank, Eddington, Weyl, Metz, Bavink. 
3. If conflicts arise between the interpretational framework and some results of 
the scientific theory being interpreted, there should be a willingness to revise 
these underlying philosophical assumptions, that is, to accomodate the tradi- 
tional philosophical outlook to the new challenge. Although philosophers 
seem to be very conservative in the revision of traditional concepts and as- 
sumptions, the examples of Cassirer, Elsbach, Winteritz and of the early 
Reichenbach show, that all of them were willing to revise the Kantian interpre- 
tative framework about how to apply the transcendental method and what to 
count as an a priori condition for human experience. Consider their far-reach- 
ing concessions in contrast to the majority of Kantians who insisted on the 
rigid adherence to their basic premises, immunizing themselves against any 
possible refutation by scientific results. (Natorp, Honigswald, Sellien, etc.).11 
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4. Philosophical interpretations are not the right place for a critique of the meth- 
ods, goals or results of scientific theories, because only scientific criteria de- 
cide about their adequacy in scientific discourse. Philosophers do not have to 
judge about the accuracy of theories. Philosophers do not have to judge about 
the accuracy of theories, but they can help to make them more accessible to 
nonscientists by analysing their content and their methods and putting them 
into broader context ("Wissenschaftsanalyse" in the sense of Reichenbach). 
5. In order to a avoid unbalanced presentations and to avoid the danger of only 
noticing what is in accordance with one's own prefixed interpretational frame- 
work,12 it is very helpful to study competing interpretations made from a 
very different perspective, even if one doesn't agree with them. It is by no 
means an accident, that the richest interpretations were made by Reichenbach 
and Metz, both philosophers who very actively discussed all kinds of aspects 
of relativity theory with proponents of virtually all the other contemporary 
schools. 13 All these disputes helped them to overcome the natural tendency 
toward a one-sided interpretation. 
6. When the previously mentioned preconditions are fulfilled, the crudest forms 
of misinterpretation can be avoided. But still, there will remain a large spec- 
trum of competing interpretations of one and the same theory. It is useful to 
have some criteria for a comparison of these interpretations. I propose the 
following ones: 
Breadth: The total amount of scientific material incorporated into the interpre- 
tation. Compare the difference in quality between Reichenbach's Philosophie 
der Raum-Zeit or Meyerson/Metz's accounts of la Relativitd against the lean 
traces of relativity theory in the writings of Natorp, Driesch, Brunschvicg and 
many others. 
Depth: Only a few authors tried to include more complicated themata in their 
interpretations, for example, Reichenbach's discussion of the repetition of the 
Michelson-Morley experiments, Metz's clarification of the meaning of rela- 
tivistic length contractions, Eddington's idiosyncratic but at least stimulating 
treatment of the field equations of general relativity in his Space, Time, and 
Gravitation. 
Currentness: Only a few interpreters really understood those fields that were 
still under debate among scientists of the time, for example, the issue of singu- 
larities in general relativity, the debates about different models of cosmology, 
and also Russell's vision of a coordinate-free form of general relativity. 
Historical context: E.g., Cassirer's well-founded claim that Einstein's relativity 
theory constitutes a further stage in the gradual substitution of material sub- 
stances with mathematical forms, Meyerson's original, but debatable thesis of 
Hegelian traces in Einstein's Deduction Relativiste). 
Naturalness of interpretation: That is, avoidance of conceptual gymnastics to 
accommodate the factual content (Reichenbach, Schlick, Cassirer), and finally 
Uniformity and harmony in presentation (Cassirer, Schlick, Meyerson, 
Reichenbach in his axiomatics). 
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Among the contemporary interpretations of the theories of relativity, Hans 
Reichenbach fulfilled all preconditions and most of the criteria in the sixth point 
above. Schlick's interpretation, preferred by Einstein between 1915 and 1925, was too 
cursory-his early violent death prevented a more detailed account from his pen. 
Meyerson's interpretation, favored by the later Einstein, and Metz's later contribu- 
tions very much in the spirit of Meyerson, worked as a sort of complementary inter- 
pretation focussing on points underestimated by the logical empiricists. But in toto it 
was certainly much less exhaustive and broad than Reichenbach's oeuvre on relativi- 
ty-mainly on special relativity. The general theory of relativity doesn't seem to have 
received an equally balanced treatment by contemporaries-its complexity was only 
fairly appreciated much later, e.g. in writings of A. Griinbaum, M. Friedman or C. 
Ray (to name just a few). 
It is only by giving this set of criteria to compare the quality of competing inter- 
pretations, that interpretational relativism can be avoided. In my opinion, these 
main criteria (perhaps among others, less trivial and not yet formulated ones) allow us 
to treat competing interpretations of scientific theories in the same objective, rational 
way in which philosophers of science have tried to deal with competing scientific the- 
ories for many decades. I am well aware of the fact that the preconditions and criteria 
listed above will be as controversial as the analogous proposals for criteria of theory 
evaluation have been. But at least they might trigger the beginning of a discussion 
about comparative evaluations of philosophical interpretations of scientific theories. 
This should, in the light of the ongoing discussions about the philosophical interpreta- 
tion of quantum mechanics, quantum field theories, etc., be an important topic on the 
agenda of philosophers of science. 
Notes 
1First of all, many thanks for the invitation to the organizers of the PSA meeting 
and to Prof. Don Howard (Univ. of Kentucky, Lexington), who had initiated the 
Colloquium on "Recent Work in the History of the Philosophy of Science". My dis- 
sertation was supervised by Prof. Dr. Andreas Kleinert (Institut fur Geschichte der 
Naturwissenschaften, Hamburg) and Prof. Dr. Lothar Schifer (Philosophisches 
Seminar, Univ. Hamburg). The editors at the Collected Papers of Albert Einstein in 
Boston and many archivists and librarians elsewhere have supported my research. 
Miss Ann M. Lehar helped me a lot in improving my English for the written version 
of this paper. 
2Interpretationen und Fehlinterpretationen der speziellen und der allgemeinen 
Relativitdtstheorie durch Zeitgenossen Albert Einsteins, Birkhauser, Basel, 1990; ca. 
800 pp., more than 3000 bibliographic entries, many figures and tables. 
3See also Chr. Ray: The Evolution of Relativity, Hilger, Bristol, 1987, for a similar 
view of relativity theory. 
4See also section 4.8. of my thesis (fn. 2). 
5Einstein later reflected about alternative names, such as 'theory of absoluta' or 
'theory of invariants' to distinguish his theory from what was commonly refered to as 
'relativism' - see sect. 2.4. of my thesis (fn.2). 
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6When Einstein made c a variable dependent on the gravitational potential in his 
Prague theory of 1911, several Machians (and I would also expect Mach himself) re- 
garded this (erroneously) as a fulfillment of their demand of rigorous relativization. 
7A recipe that Heisenberg later tried to implement in quantum mechanics. 
8Vaihinger's pupils declared it as merely a convenient fiction; Dingler's certicism 
repeatedly declared relativity theory as stillborn and portrayed himself in the role of a 
high priest ringing its death knell; see sections 4.4. and 4.5.4. of my thesis. (fn.2). 
9In my thesis, I treated the discussion between Kraus, Urbach and Frank in more 
detail (sect. 5.3.) and I also studied one person (Reichenbach) in the context of a mul- 
tiple front war (sect. 3.4.3.). But other figures such as Dingier and Reichenbach are 
worth studying in more detail. 
10For example, the neo-Kantian journalist Drill wrote angrily in reply to Max 
Bor: "I'm not willing to talk about Einstein and I'm not competent to do so. [...]. 
But nobody has to accept it, when a scientific theory tries to cheat common sense, 
whoever may have formulated it." And many professional philosophers did not react 
much better. 
11The Kantian Drill emphatically wrote against the reformist wing: "A philoso- 
pher should know that physics can't lead the way for philosophy. It is the latter's task 
to find out the necessary conditions for all knowledge, including all sciences." 
12Somehow according to the principle: one sees what one expects to see. Note 
that theory-ladenness of observation was emphasized by Duhem and Quine! 
13See sect. 5.1. and 5.2 of my thesis. 
